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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
RENAE REID BOLSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20051052-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
I. ANY "INVITED ERROR" WAS REMEDIED AND BECAME MOOT 
WHEN THE TRIAL COURT WAS GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO 
CORRECT THE ERROR ON BOLSON'S MOTION TO ARREST 
JUDGMENT, THEREBY PRESERVING THE ISSUE FOR APPEAL. 
The State argues that Bolson is foreclosed from arguing that the State's 
willfulness jury instruction was incorrect because her counsel stipulated to it below. 
Brief of Appellee ("Br. Appee.") at 16. In doing so, the State forgets that Bolson is 
appealing the trial court's denial of her motion to arrest judgment where the court 
addressed the merits of the challenged jury instruction. The State's argument also 
ignores the policy and purpose upon which the invited error doctrine is premised and 
seeks to promote a manifest injustice on a purely tactical basis. See, State v. Powell, 
2007 UT 9, f 17 (declining to apply the invited error doctrine even though Powell's trial 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
counsel stipulated to the jury instruction challenged on appeal). 
The invited error doctrine is "crafted to discourage parties from intentionally 
misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal [and] to 
give the trial court the first opportunity to address the claim of error." State v. 
Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, f 12 (citations and quotations omitted); see also, State v. 
Hamilton, 70 P.3d 111 (Utah 2003) (explaining the reason for the doctrine is that "the 
trial court should have the first opportunity to address a claim of error"); State v. 
Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996) (same). Thus, the invited error doctrine is 
designed to prevent a party from taking a strategic position at trial then taking an 
opposing position on appeal because the trial strategy was unsuccessful. See, State v. 
Dunn, 820 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993). 
The invited error doctrine does not apply here because Bolson filed a motion to 
arrest judgment, thereby duly preserving the issue for appeal. Even assuming arguendo 
that application of the doctrine was not foreclosed by Bolson's post-trial motion, the 
doctrine still does not apply. There is no basis on these facts for a claim that defense 
counsel sought to intentionally mislead the trial court in an attempt to preserve a ground 
for reversal on appeal or to deprive the trial court of an opportunity to address the error. 
Nor does the State so claim. The State prepared the jury instruction. Defense counsel 
could have had no strategic reason for stipulating to a jury instruction that misled the jury 
to convict Bolson for less than willful conduct. Moreover, the trial court was given a full 
and fair opportunity to address the merits of the claim of error in Bolson's motion to 
2 
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arrest judgment, and indeed did so in a lengthy memorandum decision, thereby properly 
preserving this issue for appeal. See, Brief of Appellant ("Br. Appt"), Addendum E. 
The State does not dispute this fact. 
Thus, the invited error doctrine does not apply in this procedural context. To 
hold otherwise would be analogous to imposing a 20 mph speed limit in a school crossing 
zone at 3:00 on a Sunday morning when all of the students are at home sleeping safely in 
their beds. There, as in this case, when application of a rule deviates so far from its 
underlying purpose and original intent, the results are injustice and absurdity. 
Trial counsel's stipulation to the incorrect willfulness jury instruction is also 
reviewable under a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 
155, 158-59 (Utah 1989) (even strategic decisions are reviewed for reasonableness). One 
of the most fundamental duties a trial lawyer has is to raise and preserve all issues in the 
trial court. See, State v. Smedley, 2003 UT App 79 at TJ10, 67 P.3d 1005. Trial counsel's 
failure to assert beneficial and current law is objectively deficient performance that an 
appellate court will not excuse on a hypothetical tactical basis. State v. Moritzsky, 111 
P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App. 1989) (holding that trial counsel's failure to seek jury 
instruction reflecting current law beneficial to the client was objectively deficient 
performance, which could not conceivably have been valid trial strategy). 
Bolson has not argued ineffectiveness of trial counsel on this appeal because the 
post-trial motion to arrest judgment both properly raised and preserved the issue of the 
jury instruction and provided the trial court with the opportunity to address it first. 
3 
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However, if the invited error doctrine can be applied as inequitably as the State 
advocates, that very application establishes both objectively deficient performance and 
prejudice.1 Bolson should not be barred from raising an ineffectiveness claim by the 
procedural morass created by the purely tactical application of a rule that is applied in a 
manner out of touch with its original substantive purpose. 
ILTHE STATE FAILS TO SHOW BOLSON'S CONDUCT WAS WILLFUL OR 
THAT THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SO FIND. 
The State argues, "Because evidence showed that defendant 'deliberately 
blinded' herself to facts tending to show that the Program was a fraudulent investment 
scheme, jurors were properly instructed that her deliberate blindness allowed them to 
infer that she had knowledge of the omitted facts and that contrary statements or 
omissions to investors were willful." Br. Appee. at 17.2 
1
 The prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine requires a 
reasonable probability of a different result in the absence of the deficient performance. 
See e.g. State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988); see also, Kyles v. Whitley, 514 
U.S. 419, 434 (1994) (explaining that a "reasonable probability"of a different result is 
such that it "undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial" (citation omitted)). 
Prejudice is established if "but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient 
to undermine the confidence of the outcome." Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870 (Utah 
1993) (citations omitted). 
When there is no conceivable strategic basis for counsel's performance, 
objectively deficient performance is established. See, State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 
976 (Utah 1998) (trial counsel's failure to renew suppression motion was ineffective 
assistance); State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351 (Utah App. 1993) (trial counsel's failure to 
timely file motion to suppress constituted ineffective assistance). 
2
 The State then goes on to argue with a lengthy footnote citation that the State was not 
required to prove scienter. Id. at 18-19. This argument is irrelevant to the willfulness 
jury instruction at issue and the State seems to be unaware of the fact that Bolson already 
4 
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The State then cites the following facts as evidence of Bolson's purported 
deliberate blindness: 
(1) Bounced and late checks. The State argues that while still representing to investors 
that the Program was safe, Bolson knew in "late 2000 and early 2001" that investors' 
checks were mailed late and "bouncing with increasing frequency."3 Br. Appee. at 22. 
This statement is factually inaccurate and completely unsupported by the record. Indeed, 
the State's failure to cite to the record in support of its claim that checks were late and 
bouncing is illuminating. Br. Appee. at 22. 
Michelle Jacobsen testified that while some payments were late sometime 
during 2000, she reinvested in the Program in December 2000 and did not stop receiving 
payments until spring 2001. R1466:84-5, 105;R1469:732. John Taylor invested in the 
Program before he met Bolson and wanted to reinvest in June 2001.4 R1466:123-28, 
pointed out in her brief that the mens rea of scienter does not apply to this case. See, e.g., 
Brief of Appellant at 32 (arguing that Bolson's conduct did not rise to the level of willful 
and intentional, and that "willful and intentional conduct is the highest level of criminal 
culpability next to scienter"). 
3
 Later in its brief, the State concedes that checks did not start bouncing until "late 2000 
or early 2001" (Br. Appee. at 35). Even assuming arguendo that Bolson's conduct could 
be construed as offering or selling a security, none of the victims in this case invested in 
the Program after early 2001 and none of them testified that Bolson tried to persuade 
them to invest after checks started bouncing in the spring of 2001. 
4
 Without citing to the record, the State claims that the Program failed to make Taylor's 
mortgage payments for six or seven months until November "2000", at which time 
Taylor learned the Program had failed and he contacted the Division of Securities. Br. 
Appee. at 31. This date appears to be a typo and is incorrect. As noted herein, this 
actually occurred in November 2001. Taylor was not dissatisfied with the Program in 
November 2000 as he tried to reinvest in June 2001. See, supra. 
5 
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131, 138-39, 148-49. Tom Barberi testified about a bounced check that was quickly 
replaced in early 2000, and that he received all of his scheduled payments for several 
months after that. R1468:316. Paul Devenport did not invest in the Program until late 
2000 and did not receive his first scheduled payment that was due in April 2001. 
R1467:181. Ryan Nay received all of his payments for two years until sometime in 2001. 
R1467:219, 244-45. Mark Albright invested in February 2001 and received only a partial 
payment sometime after that month. R1468:349, 361-62. Richard Priest invested in 
December 2000 and missed payments due the spring of 2001. R1468:403-04, 409-10, 
414, 431, 436-37. When Milt Priest invested in the Program late 2000 or early 2001, his 
March - May payments were late, as Bolson told him they might be, and he was 
reimbursed by the Program presumably in June 2001. Rl470:478-81. 
Thus, other than Barberi's check that was quickly replaced with guaranteed 
funds in early 2000, there is not one iota of evidence that any check bounced in 2000 or 
even before everyone had already invested. As illustrated by the foregoing, the fact that 
some checks were paid late was not only disclosed to later investors but did not deter 
them from investing or, in the case of some already established investors who had 
received late payments, from reinvesting. 
(2) High interest rates. The State claims that the high interest rates the Program was 
paying to investors while paying high rates on mortgage payments was a "glaring sign" 
that the Program was not legitimate, and that Bolson should have known this. Br. Appee. 
at 22. This argument was never raised below and is not preserved for appeal. Thus, this 
6 
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Court should not consider it. 
Nonetheless, the State fails to acknowledge that Bolson invested in the Program 
herself and the State presented no evidence to suggest that Bolson should have any more 
knowledge or prudence than the other investors who all apparently had some concerns 
about the high mortgage interest rates (see, e.g., R1468:341-42, 404-05; R1470:507), but 
who were readily willing to risk their homes notwithstanding the "glaring signs" that the 
Program was too good to be true. 
(3) Paul Stewart's credentials. The State further points to Bolson's representation to 
investors that Paul Stewart had an impressive resume, complaining that she completed 
only "basic credit checks" on Stewart but did not conduct a more in-depth investigation. 
Br. Appee. at 22-3. This theory of culpability was expressly rejected by the trial court 
below and is not preserved because the State did not appeal that conclusion. R1360. 
In fact, Stewart had an impressive resume and by all appearances was wealthy 
and financially savvy. R1467:235-36; R1469:653, 655-67, 669-70, 702-05, 706-08; 
R1471:866-87, 888-89, 918. Lending institutions, prospective employers, prospective 
landlords, and many others in the business world routinely rely on information provided 
in credit reports without conducting further investigation. Why should Bolson be any 
different? The State does not answer this compelling question. Rather, it merely asserts 
that she should have done more than she did. The State also does not explain why Bolson 
should be held to a higher standard than the loan officers in this case who relied on the 
same information and thereby directly, if inadvertently, facilitated Stewart's scheme to 
7 
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defraud. Moreover, it is reasonable and prudent for any person to rely upon the official 
information provided in the multiple credit reports and verifications of Stewart's financial 
status and trustworthiness that Bolson relied upon in this case. 
The foregoing facts that the State relies upon to establish Bolson's "deliberate 
ignorance" are the only facts the State cites in support of Bolson's "willfulness." They 
are woefully insufficient, particularly under the case law the State cites as supporting 
authority. Br. Appee. at 20-21.5 In United States v. Schaefer, 299 F.2d 625, 628-29 (7th 
Cir. 1962), the defendant personally raised over $2 million and there was persuasive 
evidence that he intentionally lied to investors. In United States v. Meyer, 359 F.2d 837 
(7th Cir. 1966), the defendant benefited directly and personally from the scheme, was in 
complete control of the investors' funds, and had not exercised "that degree of care 
expected of a reasonably prudent person" to determine the truth of what turned out to be 
materially false representations. The court in Stone v. United States, 113 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 
1940) engaged in a similar analysis.6 Each of the defendants in these cases that are relied 
upon by the State, personally benefited from their criminal conduct and demonstrated a 
5
 The State makes what has become its tiresome but expected boilerplate "failure to 
marshal" argument, making conclusory allegations smattered with a few irrelevant cases, 
then failing to cite even one fact not marshaled. Br. Appee. at 24-6. The State's 
consistent and seeming bad faith abuse of this argument promotes unfairness by 
artificially imposing an impossible burden on appellants while facilitating the State's own 
lack of disclosure, which is exhibited by its own one-sided and inaccurate view of the 
facts. Thus this meritless argument serves only to diminish the State's credibility. 
6
 The State's reliance on the California case of People v. Simon, 886 P.2d 1271 (Cal. 
8 
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much higher level of involvement and culpability than exists in this case. 
The State also cites United States v. Schlei, 122 F.3d 944 (11th Cir. 1997), in 
support of the deliberate ignorance instruction in this case. In Schlei, the appellant was 
an attorney and he had actual knowledge that the securities he was selling were forgeries. 
Id. at 973 (holding that the deliberate ignorance instruction was improper because the 
defendant had actual knowledge of his fraud). The Schlei court explained: 
"A deliberate ignorance instruction is appropriate when the facts... 
support the inference that the defendant was aware of a high probability of the 
existence of a fact in question and purposely contrived to avoid learning all of 
the facts in order to have a defense in the event of a subsequent prosecution. ... 
[A court] should not instruct a jury regarding deliberate ignorance 'when the 
evidence only points to either actual knowledge or no knowledge on the part of 
the defendant.'" (citing and quoting United States v. Stone, 9 F.3d 934, 937 
(11th Cir. 1993), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 833 (1994) (other citations and 
quotations omitted; emphasis added)). 
In other words, because there was no evidence in this case that Bolson purposely 
contrived to avoid learning all the facts in anticipation of subsequent prosecution, the 
deliberate ignorance instruction should not have been given. The State's reliance on 
United States v. Gruenberg, 989 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that a willful blindness 
instruction stating that "[a] finding beyond reasonable doubt of a conscious purpose to 
avoid enlightenment would permit an inference of knowledge", was proper), is similarly 
misplaced. 
In stark contrast to the defendants in the cases relied upon by the State, the 
1995), is puzzling because it imposes a negligence standard. Thus it is irrelevant. 
9 
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State's theory of Bolson's willfulness hinges upon facts not supported by the evidence,7 
high interest rates that should have somehow alerted Bolson to the possibility of a scam 
but were apparently not "glaring" enough to scare off any investor,8 and Bolson's 
reliance on Paul Stewart's representations about his credentials backed by multiple credit 
reports and official letters of reference attesting to Stewart's financial solvency and 
trustworthiness.9 
With this factual backdrop provided by the State, Bolson's conduct might be 
construed as imprudent, foolish, or naive, but it is not willful by any stretch of the 
imagination. Nonetheless, this is the best the State can do with the insufficient evidence 
in this case. The State is unable to cite to a single fact in the record supporting even a 
bare inference that Bolson was "subjectively aware of a high probability of... illegal 
conduct" but deliberately blinded herself to any material fact to avoid prosecution or to 
set up a potential defense. United States v. Gray, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 12983, 24-5 (5tl 
GirO, cert denied, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 4203. 
Based on the State's factual analysis of what constitutes criminal conduct in this 
case, the State is asking this Court to impose criminal liability for hopeful imprudence, 
not willfulness or deliberate blindness. Bolson believed in the Program, she was excited 
about it, she invested in it, she helped Paul Stewart promote it, and she readily shared her 
enthusiasm with others. The fact that Bolson's trust was misplaced and that she too was 
7
 This argument hinges on bounced checks not in evidence. 
8
 This argument is not preserved. 
10 
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misled does not rise to the level of criminal conduct. 
While touting Bolson's involvement yet refusing to acknowledge the fact that 
Bolson herself is a victim who gained nothing from the Program, the State readily 
concedes that Bolson knew nothing about Stewart's fraudulent practices. However, as 
the State explained, "I think we can say you are being deliberately ignorant if you don't 
avail yourself of the opportunity of finding out if there are . . . public documents . . . that 
might make what you're saying misleading or false (R1469:762-63) [and] .. .evidence of 
Stewart's credit problems and civil judgment were material omissions that defendant 
deliberately blinded herself to." R966. As a matter of law, this conduct described by the 
State does not support criminal culpability. 
IILBOLSON WAS NOT OFFERING OR SELLING UNREGISTERED 
SECURITIES AS A MATTER OF FACT AND LAW. 
The State seems to forget that the trial court rejected its theory that Bolson's 
failure to investigate Paul Stewart beyond pulling multiple credit reports and obtaining 
various letters warranting his trustworthiness and financial status rose to the level of 
deliberate ignorance. Thus the State's argument is not preserved because it was rejected 
by the trial court and the State did not appeal. 
Rather, because the trial court concluded that Bolson's continued to promote the 
Program without disclosing problems with bounced checks and missed payments, the 
State has to rebut Bolson's prima facie showing to the contrary and demonstrate that the 
trial court's findings and conclusions regarding the purported bounced checks are 
9
 This argument was expressly rejected by the trial court. 
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supported by the evidence. The State cannot meet that burden based on the record. 
As already demonstrated herein and in Bolson's opening brief, it is a matter of 
record that Bolson did not promote the Program after January or February 2001. Further, 
according to every witness who testified for the State, the Program's serious financial 
difficulties did not become manifest until March or April 2001 when payments were not 
made. See, supra. In light of these record facts, there is no evidence that Bolson offered 
or sold a security while deliberately blinding herself to the Program's financial 
difficulties. Thus, the trial court's finding otherwise was clearly erroneous.10 
The State criticizes the authority Bolson cites in support of her claim that even if 
the State could resurrect its unpreserved theory of Bolson's culpability based on 
inadequate investigation, the evidence still does not support a finding that Bolson offered 
or sold any security. Br. Appee. at 37. The State fails to acknowledge that each of those 
authorities includes a direct quote from the courts cited. Br. Appt. at 44. Therefore, a 
closer look at each of those cases is warranted. 
In United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979), the Supreme Court considered 
the question of whether federal securities regulations were designed to protect brokers as 
well as investors. In holding that the laws were so designed, the Court further noted, "An 
10
 The State's claim that Bolson's challenge to her conviction for selling an unregistered 
security is unpreserved is completely without merit. The State concedes that Bolson 
raised the issue on a motion for directed verdict but claims her failure to "re-raise" it on 
her motion to arrest judgment forecloses her ability to have the issue reviewed on appeal. 
This is an incorrect statement of the law. The State's pinpoint citation to ^ [10 of State v. 
Montiel, 2004 UT App. 242 is not authoritative or helpful, as it merely discusses the fact 
that issues raised for the first time on appeal are reviewed for plain error. 
12 
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offer and sale clearly occurred here. Respondent placed sell orders with the brokers; the 
brokers, acting as agents, executed the orders; and the results were contracts of sale, 
which are within the statutory definition. Moreover, the fraud occurred 'in' the 'offer' 
and 'sale.'" Id at 113-1A (statutory citations omitted). Thus the Court addressed the 
elements of an offer and a sale, concluding that such occurred when orders were placed 
and executed and contracts were created, and that the fraud occurred in that process. The 
evidence in this case is devoid of any such conduct on the part of Bolson. 
The State also criticizes Bolson's reference to United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission v. Carrillo, 115 F.3d 1540 (11 Cir. 1997). The State is correct 
that this is a personal jurisdiction case. However, the State does not acknowledge the 
court's conclusion that "by advertising, offering shares, and accepting payment in this 
country, [the defendant] did everything necessary to complete the offer and sales of the 
unregistered securities here." Id. at 1545. In contrast, Bolson did not advertise, make 
offers, or accept any payments. 
Finally, the State criticizes Bolson's reference to Rubin v. United States, 449 
U.S. 424 (1981), wherein the Supreme Court held that a pledge of stock as collateral 
could be construed as an offer or sale of a security. The State's dispute with Bolson's use 
of this case is perplexing as Bolson merely quoted the Court's holding, "Obtaining a loan 
secured by a pledge of shares of stock unmistakably involves a 'disposition of [an] 
interest in a security, for value'". Id. at 429 (citation omitted); Br. Appt. at 44. Bolson's 
point here that is analogous to Naftalin and Carrillo, supra, is that the offer or sale of a 
13 
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security requires the intent, the ability, and the authority to execute and complete the 
same. This fact seems intuitive, if not to the State, but is also supported by Naftalin, 
Carrillo, and Rubin, supra. 
Bolson's counsel was unable to find any case involving the offer or sale of 
unregistered securities with a defendant whose conduct was even somewhat analogous to 
Bolson's here. Notably, the State has also cited no such case in its brief. This omission 
raises an inference that no similar case exists, probably because most prosecuting 
agencies would not bring criminal charges against someone like Bolson. 
According to the evidence on record, Bolson could not offer anyone any security. 
She could not structure or complete a sale. She could not accept payment of any kind. 
She was not a principal in the scheme. She had no control over any funds or any signing 
authority on any account. She had no authority to sign any loan documents. She did not 
and could not provide any financing. She did not participate in any loan closing. She 
received no benefit of any kind for her assistance and was in fact victimized herself by 
the principals. Moreover, Bolson had no knowledge of Paul Stewart's fraudulent 
activities and relied in good faith on his credit reports and representations of financial 
well being, which fact the State concedes. Such conduct cannot be construed as offering 
or selling any security as a matter of law. 
Based on the foregoing facts and law, Bolson did not offer or sale any 
unregistered security. Nor did she engage in a pattern of unlawful activity. 
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CONCLUSION 
Bolson respectfully requests this Court to vacate her convictions. 
Respectfully submitted this day of February, 2007. 
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